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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
WESLEY RAY RICHARDSON, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20050159-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for escape, a third degree felony. 
R.96-95. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(West 2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
la. Was any error in the magistrate's failure to explicitly order defendant 
bound over for trial harmless where defendant was subsequently convicted 
beyond a reasonable doubt? 
lb . Did defendant waive any error in the trial court's failure to hold an 
arraignment hearing when he proceeded to trial without objection? 
Because these issues were not raised below, no standard of review applies. 
2. Did the trial court correctly interpret the escape statute to apply to 
defendant's failure to return to the Uintah County Jail following his work release 
period, even though defendant was on parole? 
Standard of review. An issue of statutory interpretation presents a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. See State v. Haltom, 2005 UT App 348, ^ 
10,121 P.3d 42 (citing State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, Tf 37,52 P.3d 1210). 
3. Did the trial court properly instruct the jury on the definition of "official 
custody" as that term is used in the escape statute? 
Standard of review. "Whether a jury instruction correctly states the law 
presents a question of law . . . review[ed] for correctness." State v. Houskeeper, 
2002 UT 118,111, 62 P.3d 444. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Resolution of this case requires interpretation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-
309 (West 2004), the full text of which is included as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On 7 June 2004 the State charged defendant by information with one count 
of escape, a third degree felony. R.l. On 27 July 2004 defendant filed a 120-day 
disposition request. R.8. On 1 September 2004 the magistrate held a preliminary 
hearing. R.17-16, 107:1. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the 
magistrate allowed both parties additional time to brief the issue of whether the 
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escape statute could apply to defendant's conduct, given that defendant was on 
parole when he failed to return to the Uintah County Jail following his work 
release period. R.107:17, 20-21. Although the magistrate did not explicitly state 
that defendant was bound over for trial, the magistrate scheduled a jury trial for 
15 November 2004. R.107:18-21. The magistrate explained that if he ruled 
against defendant on the statutory interpretation issue, trial would begin on 15 
November 2004. R.107:21. No written bindover order appears in the record. 
On 10 November 2004 the trial court held a hearing at which it provided 
both the State and defense counsel a copy of a written ruling interpreting the 
escape statute to apply to defendant's conduct. R.51-50, 52 (A copy of this ruling 
is attached as Addendum B). 
On 15 November 2004, a jury convicted defendant as charged. R.84-83, 
109:79. On 24 January 2005, the trial court sentenced defendant to serve zero to 
five years in the Utah State Prison to run consecutive to the sentence defendant 
was already serving. R. 96-95. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R.98. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant violates his parole 
In May, 2004, defendant was"drf parole ffdm~a"charge~of failing to respond 
to an officer's signal to stop. R.8, 108, 109:9. Sometime in May, while still on 
parole, defendant pled guilty to a class A misdemeanor DUI charge. R. 107:6-7, 
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109:9,40. When defendant's parole officer learned of defendant's DUI conviction 
he issued a 72-hour detainer to hold defendant in jail. R.109: 9-10. 
Defendant chooses the "Halfway Back Program" over prison 
Defendant's parole officer then met with defendant and offered him a 
choice. R.109:10. Defendant could have a parole revocation hearing, or he could 
participate in the "Halfway Back Program." R.109:10,108. Defendant chose the 
"Halfway Back Program" and signed a waiver acknowledging his parole 
violation, waiving a parole revocation hearing, and agreeing to abide by the 
terms of the program. R.108 (a copy of the waiver is included as Addendum C). 
As a participant in the "Halfway Back Program," defendant agreed to 
serve ninety days in the Uintah County Jail with work release. R.108,109:10-12. 
Defendant was to be released at 5:00 a.m. and return to the jail at 10:00 p.m. each 
day. R.109:10-12. Although defendant's parole officer considered defendant to 
be "on parole" while participating in the "Halfway Back Program," he also 
considered defendant to be in the custody of the Uintah County Jail. R.109:10-
11. Defendant explicitly agreed to "comply with all rules and regulations of the 
Uintah County Jail." R.108. According to defendant's parole officer, if defendant 
successfully completed the program, then he would be "released to street 
supervision and continued on parole." R.109:18. Defendant's parole agent 
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explained that defendant "never lost his parole" while he was in the "Halfway 
Back Program." R.109:18. 
Uintah County Jail officers considered defendant to be incarcerated in the 
jail as a state inmate pursuant to a contract with the state prison. R.109:26. 
Defendant fails to return to the jail after work release 
Defendant was released from the Uintah County Jail on 26 May 2004 for 
work release. R.109:12. He failed to return by 10:00 p.m. as required. R.109:12, 
26-27. Around 11:30 pm, defendant's girlfriend called the jail and stated that she 
and defendant were on their way to the jail but they had had a flat tire. R.109:12, 
26-27. However, defendant never returned to the jail. R.109:13,15,41. 
Defendant was eventually arrested sometime in June, 2004. R. 109:35-36, 
54. He explained that he spent his time at large fishing and camping in the 
Uintah mountains. R.109:43. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I, Any error in the magistrate's failure to explicitly state that defendant 
was bound over for trial was harmless because defendant knew that he had been 
ordered to stand trial, defendant never attempted to move to quash the bindover, 
and defendant was convicted at trial beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Defendant also waived any error in the trial court's failure to hold an 
arraignment hearing when he proceeded to trial without objection. 
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II. The trial court correctly interpreted the escape statute to apply to 
defendant, even though defendant was on parole. Although the statute does not 
apply to parolees who are in custody under certain circumstances, defendant 
was not in custody under any of those particular circumstances. Even if the 
statue cannot apply to parolees, defendant was not "on parole" as that term is 
used in the escape statute. Given the purpose of the statute, "parole" must 
include a release from all physical confinement, not merely being classified as 
"on parole" by the Board of Pardons. 
III. Because the trial court correctly interpreted the escape statute to apply 
to defendant, it also correctly omitted the phrase "or the prisoner is not on 
parole" from the jury instruction defining "official custody." 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE MAGISTRATE'S FAILURE TO EXPLICITLY STATE 
THAT DEFENDANT WAS BOUND OVER FOR TRIAL WAS 
HARMLESS AND DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BE 
ARRAIGNED 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to explicitly state that 
he was bound over for trial and by failing to enter a written bindover order. 
Aplt. Br. at 4-5. He also argues that the trial court erred by failing to conduct an 
arraignment hearing. Aplt. Br. at 4-5. However, any error in the magistrate's 
failure to state that defendant was bound over, or enter a written bindover order, 
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is harmless. Additionally, defendant waived his right to be arraigned by 
proceeding to trial without objection. 
Procedural History. Defendant received a preliminary hearing. K.l 16, 
107. At the conclusion of that hearing, Lin magistrate allowed hutli parties 
additional time to brief the issue of whether the escape statute could apply Lo 
defendant's conduct, given that he was on parole when he failed to return to the 
Uintah County Jail following his work release period. R.107:17, 20-21. Although 
the magistrate did not explicitly state that defendant was bound over for trial, 
the magistrate scheduled a jury trial. R.107:18-21 1 lie magistrate explained tl I 
it he ruled against defendant on the statutory interpretation issue, trial would 
begin on 15 November 2004. R.107:21. No written bindover order appears in the 
record. 
Defendant claims that the trial court did not issue its ruling until the day of 
trial, 15 November 2004. Aplt. Br. at 4. Defendant is incorrect < hi 10 November 
2004 the trial court held a hearing at which it provided both the State and 
defense counsel a copy of a written ruling explaining why the escape statute 
applied to defendant's conduct. R.51-50, 52 (Add B). Defendant was not present 
at the 10 November 2004 hearing, but his counsel was present, and received a 
copy of the written ruling. R.52-50. After receiving the ruling, defense counsel 
told the trial court that he believed that a jury trial would no longer be necessary, 
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but that he would confirm that after speaking with defendant. R.52. A jury trial 
was held 15 November 2004, and defendant was convicted as charged. R.84-83, 
109:79. Defendant did not object to proceeding to trial without an explicit 
bindover order or arraignment hearing. 
A. Any error regarding the bindover order is harmless. 
Assuming arguendo that the magistrate erred by failing to explicitly state 
that defendant was boundover for trial, or by failing to enter a written bindover 
order, any error was harmless. "The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to 
decide whether there is probable cause to bind over for trial/7 State v. Hopkins, 
1999 UT 98, If 20, 989 P.2d 1065 (citing State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 (Utah 
1995)). The magistrate clearly found that there was probable cause because, at 
the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the magistrate set a trial date and 
explained to defendant that if he ruled against him on the statutory 
interpretation issue, defendant would proceed to trial on that date. R.107:18-21. 
Moreover, defendant does not contend that the lack of an explicit bindover 
over denied him the right to challenge the magistrate's decision. Aplt. Br. at 4-5. 
In fact, defendant proceeded to trial without objection. 
In any event, "a challenge to a bindover order is mooted once a defendant' 
has been convicted beyond a reasonable doubt/ ' State v. Quas, 837 P.2d 565, 566 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). Defendant was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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R.81, 109:79. Therefore, any error in the magistrate's failure to explicitly order 
defendant boundover for trial is harmless. See Quas, 837 P.2d at 566-67. 
III! Defendant waived his right to be arraigned. 
Defendant waived any errc e^ trial court's faih 
arraignment hearing. Defendant correctly observes that the record does not 
indicate that an arraignment hearing was held. However, the record also does 
not indicate that defendant objected to proceeding to trial without being 
arraigned. "It is generally recognized that where a defendant announces 
readiness i s rial and then proceeds to trial without having been formally 
arraigned, he/she effectively waives the right to be arraigned/' State v. Peterson, 
681 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Utah 1984). Therefore, defendant waived his right to be 
arraigned by proceeding to trial without objection. See id. 
IHE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE 
ESCAPE STATUTE TO APPLY TO DEFENDANT'S 
CONDUCT, EVEN THOUGH DEFENDANT WAS ON 
PAROLE 
Defendant contends that the trial court misinterpreted the escape statute. 
Br. Aplt. at 5-7. He argues that the statute cannot apply to his failure to return to 
the Uintah County Jail following his work release period because he was on 
parole when he failed to return. Br. Aplt. at 5-7. Defendant is incorrect. 
It is undisputed that defendant's parole was never officially revoked, and 
that his parole officer testified that defendant was still on parole while in the 
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"Halfway Back Program/' R.108, 109:10, 18. Nevertheless, the trial court 
correctly ruled that the escape statute applied to defendant. Although the statute 
does not apply to parolees who are in custody under certain circumstances, 
defendant was not in custody under any of those particular circumstances. 
Additionally, even if the statue cannot apply to parolees, defendant was not "on 
parole" as that term is used in the escape statute. 
"It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that [a Utah 
appellate court] looks 'first to the plain language of the statute' when 
interpreting meaning." Savage v. Utah Youth Village, 2004 UT 102, % 18,104 P.3d 
1242 (quoting Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997) 
(additional citations omitted)). "An equally well-settled caveat to the plain 
meaning rule states that a court should not follow the literal language of a statute 
if its plain meaning works an absurd result or is 'unreasonably confused, 
inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the express purpose of a statute.'" Id. 
(quoting Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996)). 
"Above all, . . . [the] primary objective in construing enactments is to give effect 
to the legislature's intent.'" Id. (quoting Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah 
1996)). 
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A. Although the escape statute provides an exception iui 
parolees who are In i ustody under some circumstances, 
defendant was not in custody under any of those 
circumstances. 
Defendant's status as a parolee did not render the escape statute 
inapplicable to his conduct. Under the statute, "a prisoner is guilty of escape if 
he leaves official custody without lawful authorization." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
8-309(1) (a) (i) (West 2004). The statute lists four situations in which a person can 
be in "official custody/7 It states: 
"Official custody" means 
[1J arrest whether with or without a warrant, or 
[2] confinement in a state prison, jail, institution for secure 
confinement of juvenile offenders, or 
[3] any confinement pursuant to an order of the court or 
[4] sentenced and committed and the sentence has not been 
terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on parole. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-309(4)(c). Only one of those situations, the fourth, 
excludes parolees from the definition of "official custody." See id. Because each 
situation is listed in the disjunctive, the exception for parolees found in the fourth 
situation modifies only that situation, not the prior three. 
Moreover, reading the parole exception to modify only the fourth situation 
is the only reading that avoids an "absurd result or [a result t lul | is 
'unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention ot th*> express 
purpose of a statute/" Savage, 2004 UT 102 at \ 18 (quoting Perrine, 911 P.2d at 
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1292). If parole status negated all types of "official custody" under the escape 
statute, then a parolee under situation one, who has just been arrested for 
committing a crime while on parole, could flee from the custody of arresting 
officers without committing an escape. Likewise, a parolee who was "confin[ed] 
in a state prison [or] jail," or "confin[ed] pursuant to an order of the court," as 
contemplated in situations two and three, could break out at any time without 
committing an escape. Such a reading produces a result that is absurd, 
"inoperable, [and] in blatant contravention of the express purpose of a statute/" 
Id. Therefore, given the disjunctive language of the statute, and also the need to 
avoid an absurd result, the exception for parolees must be read to apply only to 
individuals who are in "official custody" under the fourth situation. 
Defendant was not in "official custody" under the fourth situation because 
he was not "sentenced and committed" to the Uintah County Jail. Rather, under 
the second situation, defendant was "confin[ed] in a . . . jail" because he agreed 
to participate in the "Halfway Back Program," rather than return to prison 
because of his parole violation. R.108. This second definition of "official 
custody" does not have an exception for parolees. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-
309(4)(c). Therefore, although defendant was on parole while incarcerated in the 
Uintah County Jail, he was nevertheless in "official custody" for purposes of the 
escape statute. 
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Notwithstanding the above, defendant argues that the escape statute's 
definition of "confinement" includes an exception for parolees that renders the 
statute inapplicable to him. Br. Aplt. at 6-7. He reasons that because his "official 
custody" arose from his "confinement" in the Uintah County I til the escape 
statute's definition of "confinement," including its parolee exception, renders the 
statute inapplicable. Br. Aplt. at 6-7. Defendant is again incorrect. The escape 
statute provides two definitions of "confinement." The first is a general 
definition with an exception for parolees. See id. § 76-8-309(4)(a). The second is a 
more specific definition without a parolee exception. See id. § 76-8-309(4)(L ) The 
more specific definition of "confinement" controls. 
"Under general rules of statutory construction, where two statutes treat 
the same subject matter, and one statute is general while the other is specific, the 
specific provision controls." Floyd v. Western Surgical Associates, Inc., 773 P.2d 
401, 404 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing State v. Burnham, 49 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah 
1935)). This rule applies with equal force when construing general and specific 
provisions within the same statute. See State v. Hinson, 966 P.2d 273, 277 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998) ("Clearly section (12)(a) of Rule 26[, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure] is more specific than section (3) (a), and thus takes precedence over 
the same). 
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The escape statute first provides a general definition of ""confinement"" in 
subsection 4(a). It states: 
'"Confinement"" means the prisoner is: 
(i) housed in a state prison or any other facility pursuant to a 
contract with the Utah Department of Corrections after 
being sentenced and committed and the sentence has not 
been terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on parole; 
(ii) lawfully detained in a county jail prior to trial or 
sentencing or housed in a county jail after sentencing and 
commitment and the sentence has not been terminated or 
voided or the prisoner is not on parole; or 
(iii) lawfully detained following arrest. 
UTAH CODE A N N . § 76-8-309(4)(a). 
The statute then provides a more specific definition of ""confinement in the 
state prison"" in subsection (4)(c). It states: 
A person is considered confined in the state prison if he: 
(i) without authority fails to return to his place of 
confinement from work release or home visit by the time 
designated for return; 
(ii) is in prehearing custody after arrest for parole violation; 
(iii) is being housed in a county jail, after felony commitment, 
pursuant to a contract with the Department of 
Corrections; or 
(iv) is being transported as a prisoner in the state prison by 
correctional officers. 
UTAH CODE A N N . § 76-8-309(4)(c). 
Subsection (4)(c)"s definition is more specific because it defines only 
confinement in the state prison. Moreover, it addresses the precise facts of 
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defendant's custodial status. Defendant was not merely "housed in a state 
prison or any other facility" or "lawfully detained in a county jail/' under 
subsection (4)(a). Rather, under subsection (4)(c)(iii), defendant was "being 
housed county jail, after felony commitment, pursuant b» a contract with 111 ; 
Department of Corrections." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-309(4)(c)(iii). Also, under 
subsection (4)(c)(i), defendant "without authority[,] fail[ed] to return to his place 
of confinement from work release or home visit by the time designated for 
return." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-309(4)(c)(i). Defendant is considered "confined 
in the state prison" under either of these specific circumstances. Because 
subsection (4)(c) provides a more specific definition of "confinement," it controls 
over subsection (4)(a)'s general definition. See Floyd, 773 P.2d at 404; Hinson 966 
P.2dat277. 
Moreover, reliance on subsection (4)(c)'s specific definition of 
"confinement" is the only reading of the statute that avoids an "absurd result or 
[a result that] is 'unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention 
of the express purpose of a statute.'" Savage, 2004 UT 102 at f^ 18 (quoting 
Perrine, 911 P.2d at 1292). Subsection (4)(a)'s definition of confinement exempts 
parolees while subsection (4)(c)'s definition does not. If parole status negated all 
"confinement" for the purposes of the escape statute, then a parolee who was 
incarcerated in a state prison or county jail could break out at any time without 
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committing an escape. The legislature could not have intended such an absurd 
result. Therefore, subsection (4)(c)'s specific definition of "confinement7" must 
control over subsection (4)(a)/s general definition. See Savage, 2004 UT 102 at Tf 18 
(holding that statutes should be interpreted to avoid absurd results). 
Subsection (4)(c)'s definition of "confinement" controls over subsection 
(4)(a)'s definition because it is more specific and avoids an absurd result. 
Subsection (4)(c)'s definition does not contain an exception for parolees. See 
UTAH CODE A N N . § 76-8-309(4) (c). Therefore, the trial court correctly ruled that 
defendant's parole status did not render the escape statute inapplicable to his 
conduct. 
B. "Parole," as used in the escape statute, requires release from 
all physical confinement. 
Even if the escape statue is inapplicable to all parolees, defendant was not 
"on parole" as that term is used in the escape statute. The legislature used the 
term "parole" to mean that an offender is free from all physical confinement, not 
simply that he has been designated as "on parole" by the Board of Pardons. 
Given the purpose of the escape statute, the legislature must have 
intended "parole" to mean something more than simply being designated as "on 
parole" by the Board of Pardons. As explained above, the legislature could not 
have intended that an inmate could flee confinement in a state prison or county 
jail simply because he was classified by the Board of Pardons as being "on 
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parole" when he fled. As in this case, the Board of Pardons apparently requires 
some parolees to serve a period of confinement in a secure facility as a condition 
of their parole. If the escape statute does not apply to those inmates because they 
are technically "on parole" while confined, then they are free to walk out, or even 
break out of secure facilities whenever they no longer want to stay there, even 
though the Board of Pardons had determined that secure confinement is 
necessary. The legislature could not have intended such a result. Consequently, 
the term "parole" must mean more than simply being designated as "on parole." 
See Savage, 2004 UT 102 at f 18 (noting that the "primary objective in construing 
enactments is to give effect to the legislature's intent"). Rather, the term must be 
interpreted to require a release from all physical custody. 
Although defendant was classified as being "on parole," he was not 
released from all physical custody. On the contrary, the Utah Board of Pardons 
had incarcerated defendant in the Uintah County Jail as a participant in the 
"Halfway Back Program," in lieu of returning him to prison for his parole 
violation. R.108. Defendant could leave the jail for work release, but he was 
required to report back to the jail each evening and "comply with all rules and 
regulations of the . . . Uintah County Jail." R.108,109:12. 
Defendant was not "on parole," as that term is used in the statute, because 
he was not released from all physical custody. Therefore, even if the escape 
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statute cannot apply to any parolee, the trial court correctly ruled that the statute 
applied to defendant's conduct. 
The fact that the legislature repealed the absconding statute does not 
change this result. Defendant argues that the repeal of the absconding statute 
demonstrates the legislature's intent to "leave the jurisdiction of parolees to the 
Board of Pardons and Parole." Aplt. Br. at 7. Defendant's argument implies that 
his conduct would have been covered by the absconding statute, and that by 
repealing that statute, the legislature has chosen to treat parolees who flee 
custody as merely having committed a parole violation, rather than escaping. 
Defendant is again incorrect. 
The absconding statute stated that "[a]n offender absconds from a facility 
when he (a) leaves the facility without permission; or (b) fails to return at a 
prescribed time." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-309.5(1) (2003). A "facility" was 
defined as "a residential facility owned, operated, leased, or contracted by the 
Department of Corrections or a county to provide housing, programming, or 
treatment of individuals who have been placed on parole." Id. § 76-8-309.5(4)(a). 
The absconding statute was repealed 22 March 2004. See 2004 Laws of Utah ch. 
240, §4. 
Defendant's conduct would not have been covered by the absconding 
statute. Defendant failed to return to a county jail, not a "facility" as that term 
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was used in the absconding statute. A county jail could is not "a residential 
facility" that provides "housing, programming, or treatment of individuals who 
have been placed on parole." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-309.5(4)(a). Rather, a 
county jail is a secure facility that incarcerates inmates. A "facility" under the 
absconding statute was a half-way house, not a county jail. Therefore, 
defendant's failure to return to the county jail would not have been covered by 
the absconding statute and its repeal does not indicate a legislative intent to 
allow parolees to flee from county jails without committing an escape. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
THAT DEFENDANT WAS IN "OFFICIAL CUSTODY," 
EVEN THOUGH HE WAS ON PAROLE 
Finally, defendant complains that the trial court erroneously instructed the 
jury on the definition of "official custody" by excluding the words "or the 
prisoner is not on parole" from the definition.1 Aplt. Br. at 7-11. His argument 
rests on the same interpretation of the escape statute discussed above. 
Jury instruction four identified the elements of escape, including the 
requirement that jury find that defendant "le[ft] official custody without lawful 
authorization." R.77 (Add. D). Jury instruction five then defined "official 
custody" as follows: 
A copy of the elements instruction and the instruction defining "official 
custody" (instructions 4 and 5) is included in Addendum D. 
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"Official Custody" means arrest whether with or without warrant, 
or confinement in a state prison, jail, institution for secure 
confinement of juvenile offenders, or any confinement pursuant to 
an order of the court or sentenced and committed and the sentence 
has not been terminated or voided. 
R.76 (Add. D). As defendant observes, instruction five tracks the statutory 
language but omits the final seven words, "or the prisoner is not on parole." See 
UTAH CODE A N N . § 76-8-309(4)(c). 
The trial court correctly omitted the portion of the statute regarding 
parole. As explained above, the omitted language modifies only the fourth 
circumstance in which a person is in "official custody," which was not at issue. 
Moreover, for the reasons explained above, the trial court correctly ruled that the 
escape statute applied to defendant's conduct, despite his parole status. 
Consequently, the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the definition of 
"official custody." 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm defendant's escape conviction. 
Respectfully submitted November 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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76-8-309, Escape and aggravated escape — Consecutive sentences —Definitions, 
(1) (a) (i) A prisoner is guilty of escape if he leaves official custody without lawful 
authorization. 
(ii) If a prisoner obtains authorization to leave official custody by means of 
deceit, fraud, or other artifice, the prisoner has not received lawful 
authorization. 
(b) Escape under this Subsection (1) is a third degree felony except as 
provided under Subsection (l)(c). 
(c) Escape under this Subsection (1) is a second degree felony if: 
(i) the actor escapes from a state prison; or 
(ii) (A) the actor is convicted as a party to the offense, as defined in Section 
76-2-202; and 
(B) the actor is an employee at or a volunteer of a law enforcement 
agency, the Department of Corrections, a county or district attorney's 
office, the office of the state attorney general, the Board of Pardons and 
Parole, or the courts, the Judicial Council, the Office of the Court 
Administrator, or similar administrative units in the judicial branch of 
government. 
(2) (a) A prisoner is guilty of aggravated escape if in the commission of an escape 
he uses a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 76-1-601, or causes serious 
bodily injury to another. 
(b) Aggravated escape is a first degree felony. 
(3) Any prison term imposed upon a prisoner for escape under this section shall 
run consecutively with any other sentence. 
(4) For the purposes of this section: 
(a) "Confinement" means the prisoner is: 
(i) housed in a state prison or any other facility pursuant to a contract with 
the Utah Department of Corrections after being sentenced and committed 
and the sentence has not been terminated or voided or the prisoner is not 
on parole; 
(ii) lawfully detained in a county jail prior to trial or sentencing or housed 
in a county jail after sentencing and commitment and the sentence has not 
been terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on parole; or 
(iii) lawfully detained following arrest. 
(b) "Escape" is considered to be a continuing activity commencing with the 
conception of the design to escape and continuing until the escaping prisoner 
is returned to official custody or the prisoner's attempt to escape is thwarted 
or abandoned. 
(c) "Official custody" means arrest, whether with or without warrant, or 
confinement in a state prison, jail, institution for secure confinement of 
juvenile offenders, or any confinement pursuant to an order of the court or 
sentenced and committed and the sentence has not been terminated or voided 
or the prisoner is not on parole. A person is considered confined in the state 
prison if he: 
(i) without authority fails to return to his place of confinement from work 
release or home visit by the time designated for return; 
(ii) is in prehearing custody after arrest for parole violation; 
(iii) is being housed in a county jail, after felony commitment, pursuant to 
a contract with the Department of Corrections; or 
(iv) is being transported as a prisoner in the state prison by correctional 
officers. 
(d) "Prisoner" means any person who is in official custody and includes 
persons under trusty status. 
(e) "Volunteer" means any person who donates service without pay or other 
compensation except expenses actually and reasonably incurred as approved 
by the supervising agency. 
Addendum B 
°<& 4fy, % v* IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - ~ r /
 ? ^% 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF u f ^ H % ^ | / ^ 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WESLEY RAY RICHARDSON, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Case No. 041800281 
Judge John R. Anderson 
The issue before the court is whether UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-309 applies to an 
individual who had been paroled from the Utah State Prison and put on the "Half-Way-Back" 
work release program, but did not return to the Uintah County jail at the required time. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-309 provides in part: 
(l)(a)(i) A prisoner is guilty of escape if he leaves official custody without lawful authorization. 
(4)(c) "Official custody" means arrest, whether with or without warrant, or 
confinement in a state prison, jail, institution for secure confinement of juvenile 
offenders, or any confinement pursuant to an order of the court or sentenced and 
committed and the sentence has not been terminated or voided or the prisoner is 
not on parole. A person is considered confined in the state prison if he: 
(i) without authority fails to return to his place of confinement from work 
release or home visit by the time designated for return; 
This particular subsection indicates that the Defendant sub judice could be considered confined 
in the state prison if he without authority failed to return to the Uintah County jail (the place of 
his confinement) from work release. Additionally, although the Defendant had been "paroled" 
from the Utah State Prison, this was only to allow enrollment in the "Half-Way-Back" program. 
The Defendant was not released from custody and was therefore not on parole, which under 
subsection (4)(c) would have negated official custody. 
Based on the above, the Court hereby Rules that UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-309 applies to 
this particular fact pattern. 
Dated this /Mr; ay of November, 2004 
John R. Anderson, District Court Judge 
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Addendum C 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE 
HALFWAY BACK PROGRAM 
WAIVER OF PERSONAL APPEARANCE 
I, Wesley Richardson, USP# 174095 understand I have the right to appear before the 
Utah State Board of Pardons and Parole with regard to modifications of my parole terms 
or special conditions of my Parole Agreement. I hereby waive my right to a personal 
appearance before the Board and request that my Parole Agreement be amended to add or 
modify the following condition(s) or term(s) of Parole as outlined below. I do so 
voluntarily and without duress or coercion. 
I agree to enter and successfully complete the Halfway Back program at the Uintah 
County Jail in Lieu of immediate return to the Utah State Prison. I understand I will 
serve an indeterminate period of time in the Uintah County Jail and will be subject to all 
rules and regulations of the facility. In addition, I understand that violation of the rules of 
the jail may result in my return to the Utah State Prison. 
I understand that I am financially responsible for any significant medical costs. 
1) That I will Successfully complete the Halfway Back Program at the Uintah 
County Jail, and comply with all rules and regulations of the Uintah County 
Jail. 
2) I will serve 90 days at the Uintah County Jail in the Halfway Back Program. 
3) Take Anta Buse if prescribed by a physician. 
By signing this Waiver, I acknowledge that I have not complied with my Parole 
Agreement and parole revocation proceeding could be initiated against me based on my 
non-compliance. This Waiver shall be implemented immediately and will be submitted 
to the Board of Pardons for approval within four (4) days. 
I acknowledge there is no disability that would prevent me from complying with any 








INSTRUCTION NUMBER ^7 
In order to establish the commission of any crime charged, 
the State must prove certain essential facts which the statutes 
of this State define as being necessary elements constituting the 
crime charged. In the case now before the Court, proof of the 
commission of the crime of ESCAPE as charged in the Information 
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the 
following: 
1. That on or between May 27, 2 0 04 and May 28, 2 0 04; 
2. In Uintah County, State of Utah; 
3. The Defendant Wesley Ray Richardson 
4. Did knowingly, intentionally or recklessly leave 
official custody without lawful authorization. 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER >^ 
"Official custody" means arrest, whether with or without 
warrant, or confinement in a state prison, jail, institution for 
secure confinement of juvenile offenders, or any confinement 
pursuant to an order of the court or sentenced and committed and 
the sentence has not been terminated or voided. 
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